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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

s·rATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No. 190 89

-v-

CALVIN GEORGE SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, a firstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§§

76-2-202, 76-3-

203(1), 76-6-302 (1978); and with theft, a second-degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§§

76-2-202, 76-3-203(2), 76-6-404

11978); for his role in the armed robbery of Mr. Alma G. Winn.
DISPOSITION IN THE LC&J'ER COURT
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft
following a jury trial in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin presiding.

He was

sentenced on March 4, 1983, to two concurrent terms of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison--to be served
consecutively with a one-year term for using a firearm in the
'Ommission of the crimes.
·' new trial.

On March 8, 1983, appellant moved for

That motion was subsequently denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and j udgmec.t
of the 1 ow er court, and of its denial of appellant's motion for a
new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alma Winn and his wife had been visited by various
members of their family on New Year's Day, 1981 (Tl. 4).
8:30 p.m., Mr. Winn took a relative home,

About

returning to his own

residence some twenty minutes later (Tl. 4-5).

It was dark

outside (Tl. 10-11) •
He pulled into his unlighted garage, and as he got out
of his car and proceeded toward the door to his home, he was
confronted by two men (Tl. 5-6, 14-16).

Al though visibility in

the garage was poor, Mr. Winn could see that the men were armed
and masked (Tl. 6, 10-13).

Mr. Winn,

was somewhat familiar with weapons

a retired military officer,

(Tl. 11), and it was his

opinion that the men were carrying dark-colored .38 caliber
revolvers (Tl. 6, 11-12, 14, 17).

Because the men were wearing

gloves and had black nylon stockings pulled down over their
and necks, Mr. Winn could not determine their race or national
origin (Tl. 6, 11, 16).
The men pointed their guns at him, grabbed him, pullec
him to the ground, jabbed him with their guns, and pushed him
against the door to his home as he "struggled" with them (Tl· 6
7, 12, 14, 17-18).

Mrs. Winn, over-heard the commotion, and care

to the door to see what was going on; but because Mr. Winn was
lying against the door, his wife was unable to open it more th 1

-2-

a few inches (Tl· 6-7).

One of the men told the other to "[glet

1, 1 ,

wallet and let's get the hell out of here" (Tl. 7-8, 18) •

.

either one grabbed the wallet from Mr. Winn's back pocket and

then the two assailants fled

(Tl. 7-8, 12).

Mr. Winn followed his assailants out of the garage (Tl.
121.

There was sufficient light from the nearby streetlights to
him to see them run out to the road in front of his

residence, turn west and run toward Redwood Road (which is about
a quarter of a mile from the Winn residence), and cross the
Jordan River bridge (Tl. 8-11).

Mr. Winn returned to the house

and phoned the police (Tl. 8-9, 12).
The police subsequently found nothing in the garage to
establish the identities of the two assailants (Tl. 9).
Mr. Winn's wallet had contained identification and
credit cards,

$75 or $80 in cash, and an unendorsed $10,000

C.S.B. cashier's check made out to the Federal Reserve System
ITl. 10, 14-15).

Jay Sanchez was subsequently arrested during the summer
of 1981 for his involvement in a South Jordan robbery with his
cousin, Dickie Carrillo (Tl. 75-76).
'ime of the arrest (Tl. 76).

He was on parole at the

After the arrest, the prosecutor

•,ffered to grant Sanchez transactional immunity for a number of
rimes listed in the "grant of immunity" document, provided that
·:· testify "fully and truthfully" regarding his and any other's
'"' l1cipation in the crimes listed therein (R. 26; Tl. 22-24, 631.

70-79, 81).

.s.e.e_ .aLs..Q Grant of Immunity document

-3-

(R. 57) •

Near the end of the list of crimes was a "blanket
immunity" provision, i.e., a provision where the blanks had not
been filled in with the specifics of any particular crime (T. Si:
Tl. 78).

This provision allowed the State to grant Sanchez

immunity for other unspecified crimes in which he was involved,
should he later confess and testify to them (Tl. 78, 81).

The

Winn robbery was not specifically listed in the document; nor
there a clause therein which required Sanchez to implicate
appellant or Mr. Fernandez (appellant's co-defendant) in any
crime as a condition of him receiving immunity (Tl. 82-83; T3.
Grant of Immunity document CR. 57) •

58) •

Pursuant to this immunity grant, and to a subsequent
promise by the prosecutor that the Winn robbery would fall under
the blanket provision, Sanchez confessed to and issued a sworn
statemept regarding the participation of appellant, Mr.
Fernandez, Mr. Mitchell, and himself in the Winn robbery (Tl. 22·
23, 63-64, 78-79, 81).

Sworn Statement of November 4,

1981 (R. 57).
Based upon Sanchez's statement, appellant and the
others implicated by Sanchez were subsequently arrested and
charged with the aggravated robbery and theft of Mr. Winn and hi:
property (R. 5, 46-49).
Mitchell, one of those implicated by Sanchez, test if iE;
at appellant's trial that after his arrest, he had contacted
Detective Labrum of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office
the possibility of working out a deal in return for informatior
on two robberies in which he had been involved--one of which
-4-

c1e Winn robbery (Tl. 132-135).
· ,c"1 Sheriff's Office,

..s.e.e_ .<U.s..o. Letter to Prosecutor

dated December 6, 1982 (R. 57).

No

was reached as a result of this discussion (T. 135).
.wever, on the evening before trial, Mitchell entered into a

'i

rlea agreement with the prosecutor, wherein he pled guilty to

rr,lJbery in the two robberies in which he had been involved in
return for a dismissal of the charges of theft and possession of
a firearm by a restricted person (Tl. 97-100, 103, 106, 116, 123,
129-130, 142).

Mitchell was required under the agreement to

testify "fully and truthfully" regarding his knowledge of the
robbery (Tl. 141-142).
At trial, both Sanchez and Mitchell named appellant as
an accomplice in the Winn robbery.

Both testified to having

known appellant at least a couple of months prior to the night of
the robbery (Tl. 25, 101).

Mitchell had met appellant through

Fernandez (appellant's co-defendant), with whom Mitchell had been
acquainted for several years (Tl. 101-102).
Sanchez's and Mitchell's testimony corroborated much of
."r. Winn's account of the events of the evening in question.
Mitchell testified that appellant and Fernandez had arrived at
Mitchell's apartment on the evening of January 1, 1981, around
'o:OO p.m.

(Tl. 106-107, 124, 138).

The three men discussed the

lea of "making money," i.e., committing some robberies (Tl.

1

JC8i.
1.s
1

After grabbing some nylon stockings which Mitchell kept at

apartment (Tl. 110, 114, 124), they all left in appellant's

1e and brown Lincoln Continental to pick up Sanchez (Tl• 108-
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109) .1

Appellant was driving the vehicle (Tl. 108-109).
They picked up Sanchez at his cousin's home around 7:oo

or 7:30 p.m. (Tl. 29, 65).

Sanchez brought a dark-colored .38

caliber revolver that he kept at Carrillo's (his cousin's> house
(Tl. 29-30, 66-67, 109, 139) • 2

Both Mitchell and Sanchez

testified that around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., Fernandez--who lived
near Mr. Winn's residence--reIT.arked that he "knew of this retired
colonel that supposedly had a lot of money, maybe some gold or
something" (Tl. 34, 52, 112).

Fernandez gave directions, and

appellant drove the men to Mr. Winn's residence (Tl. 34-35, 51,
112).

Sanchez testified that they saw "the colonel" outside of

his car, but inside his garage, as they passed by his home (Tl.
35, 53-54) • 3

Appellant drove about 50 or 100 feet beyond the

house, stopped on a bridge, and let Mitchell and Fernandez out of
1 Sanchez, was staying at a halfway house during that period, but
had received a pass on January 1, 1981, allowing him to leave the
facility to go to his cousin, Richard (Dickie} Carrillo's home
for the evening (Tl, 21, 26-27).
Sanchez testified that he had been planning on meeting with
appellant that night "to go out and make some money," i.e., to
"[p]ull some robberies" (Tl. 28). According to Sanchez,
appellant had recruited him in this venture <Tl. 64, 82-84).
Sanchez noted that he had not intended to actually "do the
robbery"; he was merely going along to provide the gun and to
keep company with the others involved (Tl. 56, 64, 84).
2 Sanchez admitted that he furnished the weapon used in the Winn
robbery--the only weapon that he recalled being used that night
(Tl. 45, 68). Mitchell verified that only one gun was used in
the robbery (Tl. 115, 126).
3 Mitchell testified that Mr. Winn had not yet arrived at home
when he and Fernandez got out of appellant's car and approached
the house (Tl. 125, 139-140). His recollection was that he and
Fernandez had reached the porch and were about to knock on the
front door when Mr. Winn pulled into the garage (Tl. 112-113,

125, 140).

-6-

the car (Tl· 35-36, 54).

One of them, according to Sanchez, was

cArrying Sanchez's gun (Tl. 35).
I'

Both were carrying nylon masks

35, 53, 55, 110).

After Mitchell and Fernandez departed, appellant and
Sanchez proceeded westbound in the car, made a U-turn, and then
started back toward the colonel's house (Tl. 36).

As appellant

and Sanchez were approaching the bridge on their return trip,
they saw Mitchell and Fernandez running westbound toward them
1Tl. 36, 681.

Sanchez testified that Mitchell and Fernandez

rep:irted that the colonel had resisted the robbery and that, as
he could recall, the robbery was unsuccessful (Tl. 37-38, 68-69).
Recounting the events of the robbery, Mitchell
testified that he and Fernandez, both wearing nylon masks,
entered the garage and confronted Mr. Winn (Tl. 112-114).

They

wrestled him to the ground, took his wallet from his back pocket,
and left the garage (Tl. 113, 1261.

They then ran back to the

car appellant was driving and reported that the colonel had "put
up a little fight" (Tl. 1411.

The gun was returned to Sanchez

(Tl. 115); and the wallet was opened, revealing some cash and a
check (Tl. 114).

The men then allegedly talked about the

contents of the wallet and split up the cash among the four of
them (Tl. 114, 126-1271.

Mitchell testified that he tore up the

check and threw it out the window (Tl. 114, 127-128).

The wallet

was also thrown out the window (Tl. 126).
Sanchez recalled telling the others that he had to be
hork at the halfway house by 11:00 p.m. and that they should
"''rn0diately return him to his cousin's house--which they did (Tl·

-7-

37-381.

This recollection was verified by Mitchell's testimon;

(Tl. 141).
Appellant testified at trial in his own defense.

lk

admitted his acquaintance with Sanchez, Fernandez, and Mitchell
(T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-2151.

He indicated that he had

interacted socially with Sanchez and Fernandez on a number of
occasions CT2. 187-1891.

Even though he did not consider Sanchez

to be a good friend, he did admit to having sponsored Sanchez or.
one occasion while the latter was in the halfway house (T2. 1891.
Appellant said that he did consider Fernandez fo be his friend
(T2. 187-1881.

In fact, according to his and his step-mother's

(Mrs. Smith's) testimonies, appellant and Fernandez were indeed
together on the evening in question (T2. 154, 156-159, 163, 170171, 201, 203-205, 216-2171.

Finally, appellant admitted to

ownin<; and having in his possession, on the night in question, a
car fitting the description rendered by the State's witnesses
CT2. 162-163, 190, 211, 217-2181.
Despite these admissions, appellant denied any
participation in the Winn robbery CT2. 207, 211-213, 2151.

He

and his step-mother testified that he was at home with his fami'
and Fernandez on the evening of January 1, 1981 (T2. 158-159,
170-171, 203-205, 216-2171.

However, much of this testimony

dealt with where appellant was the night btlQil and during the
earlier part of the day of the robbery (T2. 151-153, 162-163,
170, 172-173, 177-178, 182-184, 191-203).
During the remainder of New Year's Day and evening--

-8-

rding to Mrs. Smith, 4 --the family, Fernandez, and appellant
--1

a;ed at home watching television

(T2. 157, 165).

However, she

,:d not remember what programs or football games, i f any, they
o0t,_-hed (T2. 165) • 5
Appellant also claimed that they "sat around" and
'dtched television (T2. 204-205), and that neither he nor
left the apartment that night IT2. 205).

Mrs. Smith

:estified that she did not recall seeing either of them leave the
2?artment that evening (T2. 159).
There is a question as to how late Mrs. Smith stayed up
that evening and whether she would have seen them leave the
apartment that night had they done so.

She said that she went to

:;ed about midnight (T2. 166), but later conceded that she had
admitted four days earlier, in the county attorney's office, that
she did not know when she had retired to bed on that particular
P'fening (T2. 166-16 9).
Judge Baldwin instructed the jury on the law pertinent
to the case (R. 144-182).

Notably, the defense did not ask for a

4
In an apparent effort to portray Mrs. Smith as an unbiased,
disinterested witness--despite her relationship with appellant as
his step-mother--appellant and Mrs. Smith testified that they
were not very fond of each other and that they did not consider
:hemselves to be friends IT2. 150, 161, 178, 192-193, 208-209).

- She recalled Fernandez leaving for a time during the afternoon
IT2. 157-158), but did not recall appellant leaving with him IT2.
: 5 7J •
hf'f'el lant

testified that he and Fernandez left the apartment
about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m, that he took Fernandez home so
he rould change his clothes, and that they then returned to
-,,- apartment to eat dinner and watch a college football game on
'Pl,vis1on (T2. 203-204).
He could not remember what game they
,--,e horn<' to watch IT2. 204).
-9-

men could not possibly reach verdict beyond reasonable doubt).
For it is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to
determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, the credibility
witnesses, and the weight to give conflicting evidence.

"f

.sta.t._e

v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983); State v. Mccardell,
Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945; State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216,
218 (1976).

And it is

who, on appeal, bears the

burden of establishing that the evidence was so inconclusive or
insubstantial.
(1980).

State y. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168

Appellant has failed to meet this burden.
It must be noted at the outset that neither the mere

failure of a victim to identify his assailants nor the absence
of physical evidence at the scene of the crimes which links a
defendant to those crimes is sufficient to render improper a
jury verdict based upon other adequate direct or circumstantial
evidence.

The central issue in this case is whether the

evidence

presented by the State was sufficient to

establish each of the elements of the offenses charged and thus
sustain the jury's verdict.
Appellant was convicted as an accomplice, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-202 (1978), in the aggravated robbery

of Mr. Winn and the theft of the contents of his wallet.
Section 76-2-202 provides:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
-12-

To convict appellant as an accomplice to the
robbery of Mr. Winn, the jury had to find
.1ppe 11 ant

that

(1)

solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
aided another person or persons to engage in the

robbery;

(2) that appellant did so intentionally or knowingly;

(3) that a deadly weapon, firearm, or facsimile of a firearm

cind

1-as used in the commission of the crime.
3§ 76-2-202, 76-6-302 <1978).
27, 28

(R. 155, 169-171).

Utah Code Ann.

Se..e jury instructions nos. 13,

A robbery, as used above, is

committed when (a) personal property is taken from another
oerson,

(b) that property is in the possession or the immediate

presence of such other person at the time it is taken, (c) the
property is taken contrary to the will of such other person,
the taking is accomplished by means of force or fear,
taking is unlawful, and (f) the taking is intentional.
Code Ann.§§ 76-6-301(1)

(1978).

(d)

(el the
Utah

Se..e jury instructions nos. 17-

18 (R. 159-160).

To convict appellant as an accomplice to the theft of

::r. Winn's property, the jury had to find

(1)

that appellant

sc•l i cited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally
0ided another person to obtain or exercise unauthorized control
·"er the property of Mr. Winn; ( 2) that he did so intentionally,
1,""'inqly, or recklessly; (3) that the property did belong to
\vinn;

'"I" ive
I

(4) that appellant had the purpose at that time to

the owner of said property; ( 5) either that the value of

µroperty exceeded $1,000 or that one of the actors in the
-13-

Furthermore, Mrs. Smith indicated that she was unsure
of the time when she retired to bed that evening (T2. 166-1691.
After having stayed up until 1:30 or 2:30 a.m. the night before
(T2. 177-178), she may well have gotten tired early in the
evening on January 1.

Under such circumstances, the jury coulG

have reasonably inferred that Mrs. Smith retired to bed early
that evening and was not awake when appellant left the
apartment.
Finally, Mrs. Smith testified that appellant was
present in the apartment when dinner was served, which alleged!)'
occurred between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. <T2. 158, 165).

Even if

Mrs. Smith were telling the truth, the jury could have
reasonably believed that dinner was served around 5:00 p.m. and
that appellant left the apartment sometime after dinner,
arriving at Mitchell's apartment around 6:00 p.m., as testified
to by Mitchell (Tl. 106-107, 124, 138).
Appellant asserts, however, that there was evidence l'.
show that he was at home when the robbery was taking place.

He

then cites State y. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978), for the
proposition that where there is any reasonable view of the
credible evidence which is reconcilable with appellant's
innocence, a reasonable doubt exists as to his guilt (emphasis
added).

But, in that same case, this Court also stated:
[Wle emphasize that this does not mean just
any view of any of the evidence, however
unsubstantial or incredible, which a party to
such a controversy may dream up.
-16-

Utah, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (1978).

And again, in

Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 232 Cl980), this court held
ncr

'J1e

.nL1d'Y

"evidence relied upon by the jury need not refute
allegations made by the defendant, as long as the jury

e1dict is supported by substantial evidence,"
thi_s

which it is in

case.
Furthermore, the jury was not required to even believe

df'pellant or his step-mother:
The jury were not obligated to accept as true
defendant's own version of the evidence nor
his self-exculpating statements as to his
intentions and his conduct. They were
entitled to use their own judgment as to what
evidence they would believe and to draw any
reasonable inferences therefrom.
State y. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979).

Having

evaluated the defense witnesses' demeanor and candor on the
stand, having been aware of the witnesses' potential motives to

fabricate their testimonies (i.e., their family relationship and
ctppellant's desire to stay out of prison), and having observed
firs Smith's faulty recollection of the events which transpired
on the day in question, the jury did not act unreasonably in

disregarding or giving less weight to the testimony rendered by
't1ose witnesses in making its determination.

That being the

case, there was substantial evidence to support the verdicts of

to the counts of aggravated robbery and theft.
Appellant also claims that the testimonies of two
accomplices were inherently unbelievable and were not
'Oborated by other evidence at trial.
-17-

The trustworthiness of or the weight to be given their
testimony is clearly a matter for the jury.

The fact that they

had received some benefit from the State in return for their
testimony is also but a factor which the jury could weigh in
assessing credibility and did not make the witnesses' testimony
unreliable.

Moreover, neither the grant of immunity nor

the plea bargain agreement necessarily gave these witnesses a
"motive to lie"--especially given the fact that both agreements
were conditioned upon them testifying fully and truthfully.
26, 57; Tl. 22-24, 63-64, 70-79, 81, 141-142) .'6

(R.

Certainly the

State's witnesses had no greater "motive to lie" than did
appellant and his step-mother. 7

Appellant claims Sanchez's

criminal record indicates a "motive to lie".

If this were so,

certainly we could have a stand-off in this case since the
record establishes that appellant too had a criminal record.
Thus, the criminal records of all witnesses were useful for
impeachment purposes on both sides, and the weight to be
accorded the respective testimony is best left to the trier of
fact.
6 Nor was there any apparent "motive to lie" based upon animosity
between them and appellant. Appellant admitted that he knew botr
of the witnesses (T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-215), that he
had interacted socially with at least Sanchez (T2. 189), and that
he had in fact sponsored Sanchez on one occasion when the latter
was in the halfway house (T2. 189). He made no indication that
he was on "bad terms" with either of the witnesses.
7 Despite to appellant's assertion that he and his step-mother
were not on the best of terms, Mrs. Smith had not only known
appellant about ten years when she testified
she (11
was married to appellant's father and (2) was 11v1ng in the samE
apartment as appellant in January of 1981 (T2. 161, 193) •
-18-

In any event, this Court has held that a possible
""'' lvP

to lie on the part of a witness--even though that witness

rnav have previously been involved in similar criminal activity-noes not necessarily render his testimony so suspect as to leave
a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt.

In State y.

lillsQn, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977), the appellant there argued

that the testimony of an undercover agent who purchased a
balloon of heroin in a controlled buy was inherently unreliable
because she was a former heroin user and she therefore had a
motive to lie.

Since the agent's testimony was considered

indispensable to the appellant's conviction, the appellant
argued that there must necessarily have been a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.

Rejecting this reasoning, this Court observed:

The judging of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence is
exclusively the prerogative of the jury.
Consequently we are obliged to assume that
the jury believed those aspects of the
evidence, and drew those inferences that
reasonably could be drawn therefrom, in the
light favorable to the verdict.
State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66, 68 <1977).
.EatQn,

.5.e..e State v •

Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116-1117 (1977).
The jury in this case determined that the testimony

rendered by Sanchez and Mitchell was credible.

Therefore,

unless appellant can show that the evidence was so lacking that
"reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond
' reasonable doubt,•
Rl4,

State v. Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811, 813-

<1977), the validity of the witnesses' testimonies and

appellant's resulting conviction should be upheld.
-19-

Finally, the testimony of Sanchez and Mitchell was,
indeed, corroborated by other evidence at trial.

First, their

own testimonies were highly corroborative of one another.

With

a few exceptions, they gave similar accounts of the events
surrounding the robbery. 8

.se..e.

State y.

Utah, --P.2d--,

No. 19284, slip op. at 2 (April 26, 1984); State v. Watts, Utah,
675 P.2d 566, 568 <1983) (contradictory evidence at trial is not
sufficient to disturb jury verdict).
Second, appellant completely overlooks the testimony
given by the victim, Mr. Winn, which was largely· corroborative
of the testimonies of Sanchez and Mitchell--the only exception
being the n..wn.b.e.1:_ of guns carried by Mr. Winn's assailants.

That

Mr. Winn could not make a positive identification of appellant
is understandable, granted that appellant was allegedly driving
the getaway car at the time of the robbery.
Appellant also ignores the corroborative value of some
of his own admissions at trial.

.se..e_ State y. Romero, Utah, 554

P.2d 216, 219 (1976); State y. Mattiyi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31
<1911)

(defendant who takes the stand cannot escape the

consequences of any fact testified to by him).

Appellant

admitted that he was acquainted with Sanchez, Mitchell, and
Fernandez (T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-215).

Furthermore, hE

8 Their testimonies differed in only three minor respects: Ii'
whether or not a stop was made at another residence before
one was made at the Winn residence, ( 2) whether or not the
colonel was at home when the men first arrived at his residence,
and (3) some of what occurred in the appellant's car following
the robbery (Tl. 30-33, 35, 37-38, 53-54, 65, 68-70, 112-114,
125-128, 139-140).
-20-

admitted that he was with Fernandez on the evening of the
tolibery (T2. 154, 156-159, 163, 170-171, 201, 203-205, 216-217).
He

also admitted that he owned and had in his possession, in

January of 1981, a car matching the description rendered by the
state's witnesses (Tl. 26, 30, 108-109; T2. 162-163, 190, 211,
217-2181.

Certainly it was more than coincidental that Sanchez

and Mitchell--particularly when the latter was not wellacquainted with appellant (T2. 209, 214-215)--would each know
that appellant and Fernandez were together and had access to a
blue and brown Lincoln on the evening of January 1, 1981.
There was other evidence, then, to corroborate the
testimonies of each of State's challenged witnesses.
such corroboration was not necessary.

However,

As noted by this Court in

197 8:

It has long been held in this state that
the credibility of the witnesses is for the
trier of fact; and there is no rule governing
how many witnesses are needed or that the
testimony be corroborated by other evidence
before the trier of fact can decide how to
determine the weight of the testimony.

*

*

*

As to the quality of the testimony given, it
is settled that it must be so improbable that
it is completely unbelievable before it is
insufficient to uphold a conviction.
y. Middelstadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908, 910, 911

(1978).

Since 1979, these rules of law have also applied to the
testimony of an accomplice.

·us

n.2

( 1980).

..s.e.e_ State y. Ber<J, Utah, 613 P.2d

An "accomplice," such as Sanchez and Mitchell

'" the present case, is "one who participates in a crime in such
0

'''Y that he could be charged and tried for the same offense."
y,
' 1 ·2J

Cornish, Utah, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1977), and cases

therein; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978) •
-21-

Utah law provides that "[al conviction may be had on
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."
§

77-17-7(1)

(1982).

Utah Code Ann.

It further provides:

In the discretion of the court, an
instruction to the jury may be given to the
effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such an
instruction shall be given if the trial judge
finds the testimoriy of the accomplice to be
self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-17-7(2)

Cl982l.

cautionary instruction was given.
(R. 155).

In this case, such a
jury

no. 13

The jury was also instructed to take into account the

bias, motive, or interest in result of each of the witnesses, as
well as their deportment, frankness, and candor •

..5.e..e. jury

instruction no. 8 CR. 150).
Nevertheless, as the exclusive trier of fact, the jury
chose to believe the testimony of at least one of the
accomplices.

Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the

jury verdict, State

y,

Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979),

that determination and appellant's resulting conviction should
be upheld.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS JUSTIFIED IN CORRECTING
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S IMPROPER REMARKS;
FURTHERMORE, APPELLANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE
JUDGE'S COMMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL, NOR HAS HE
PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW.
Appellant complains of a comment made by the trial judge dunri0
defense counsel's closing argument.

-22-

Counsel had been assertin

, 1

,.·1t

1,J,I

the State had failed to meet its burden of proof because it
not called two other individuals as witnesses who were known

ic

have participated in a robbery with Sanchez on one occasion

in

the past.

Counsel suggested that the "missing witnesses"

rr,iyht have been the real accomplices in the Winn robbery and not
appellant (T3. 35-36).

Judge Baldwin stopped counsel, stating

that those "witnesses" were not necessary to the disposition of
this case, that the State was therefore not required to bring
them into court to testify, that the jury should disregard
counsel's comments suggesting that the State did bear such a
burden of proof, and that the defense had just as much of a
right as did the State to call those witnesses (T3. 36).
Appellant claims that this comment violated his
constitutional right to remain silent; that it impermissibly
shifted to appellant, in the eyes of the jurors, the burden of
producing evidence; and that it prevented defense counsel from
presenting a vital theory of appellant's case to the jury.
First, inasmuch, as defense counsel's line of argument
Was improper, the judge was justified in commenting to the jury

o0 he did.

The law is clear that there are occasions when a

Jcdge, as governor of the trial, must step in and restrain
cuunsel from making improper remarks to a jury:
It is the duty of the trial court to correct
mistakes of law made by counsel in argument
to the jury, and, on its own motion, to
interrupt and admonish counsel when he
exceeds the bounds of legitimate argument.
'i

Jur.

''· Jur.

2d, l'.llAl

2d, 1'Ii.al

§

§

117 (1974) (footnotes omitted}.

£e.e 75

318 (1974); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 166, 251-

-23-

253 (1958

&

Supp. 1984); State

P.2d 1165, 1168 (1982)

y,

Gilbert, 99 N.M. 316, 319, 65i

("The trial court has broad discretion

controlling argument to the jury.

i:.

If no abuse of this

discretion or prejudice to the defendant is evident, error
not result."}.

Judge Baldwin properly stopped appellant's

closing argument because it misstated the State's legal burden
of proof.
Judge Baldwin stated that the State bore no burden in
producing witnesses not known to have seen or been involved in
the case at hand CT3. 36) •
P. 2d 908, 910 (197 8)

State y. Mjddel stadt, Utah, 579

(there is no rule governing the number of

witnesses needed before the trier of fact can determine the
weight of a witness' testimony}.

The jury in this case alread1

had the testimonies of Sanchez and Mitchell.
Nonetheless, counsel argued to the jury that, inasmuch
as Carrillo and Johnson had been involved once in a robbery with
Sanchez, they were likely involved with Sanchez and Mitchell in
the Winn robbery (T3. 34-37).

Therefore, he argued, the State

should have produced them as witnesses (T3. 36).

This reasoning

is nonsensical.
Counsel alleged at trial that Sanchez had participated
in some forty felonies (Tl. 63, 73-74, 80-81); Carrillo and
Johnson were known accomplices in only one of those alleged
felonies (Tl. 75-76, 90-94).

Assuming that there were 40

felonies, under defense counsel's reasoning, anyone who may ha1·e
participated in the other 39 felonies should also have been
called by the State as witnesses to "clear themselves."
-24-

Under

theury, perhaps all known and possible acquaintances of

,11

. .rii'hez should have been brought into court.
, 0

Perhaps Sanchez

.,,,rking with "new blood" on the Winn robbery.

1

Under such

ieosu,iing, appellant could continually suggest "possible others"
.rn might have been involved A.d infinitum.

The State was only required to meet its burden of
proving the elements of the theft and aggravated robbery charges
beyond a reasonable doubt.
3

Because this burden was incorrectly

ta ted by the defense to the jury, Judge Baldwin was justified
intervening and correcting counsel's error.
In 1979, after citing a similar exchange between the

trial judge and defense counsel during the latter's closing
argument, this Court stated:
Defendant claims that the court's
comments misstated the law so as to mislead
the jury [and] that to not permit the defense
to argue that the state has failed to prove
an element of the offense is to effectively
direct a verdict in favor of the state • • •

*

*

*

To have allowed defense counsel's arguments
to go unchallenged, the jurors would have
been led to believe that the state had failed
to prove one of the elements of the crime.
The court judiciously corrected any confusion
which may have arisen.

s. Piepenbur..i, Utah, 602 P.2d 702, 707-708 (1979).
l,1Kewise, Judge Baldwin judiciously corrected any confusion
·'htch defense counsel's remarks may have created in the minds of
·''" J'iiors in this case.

His comment, then, was proper.

However, not only did defense counsel's comments
the State's legal burden of proof, they suggested the
-•iety of the "missing witness" inference in a situation

-25-

where, even under appellant's case law, such an inference could
not properly be drawn to the jurors' attention.

Admittedly, Ute

"missing witness" inference has been judicially recognized for
nearly a century •
121 (1894).

..5..e.e Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. llS,

That inference has been summarized as follows:

[Ilf a party has it peculiarly within his
powers to produce witnesses whose testimony
would elucidate the transaction, the fact
that he does not do it permits an inference
that the testimony, if produced, would have
been unfavorable.
United States y. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Recently, however, this inference has undei;;gone greater judicial
scrutiny and caution in its application, the primary reasons
being (1) that comment on the inference can easily be
misleading,

(2) that its invocation at the Md of the trial may

unnecessarily surprise the other party who was unaware that it
might be invoked, and (3) that the record is often inadequate to
support its invocation.

Comment,

"Drawing an Inference from the

Failure to Produce a Knowledgeable Witness,•

61 Calif. L. Rev.

1422, 1426, 1428-1429 (1973).
The D.C. Circuit has determined that "comment by
counsel •

as to absent witnesses is prohibited i f either of

the conditions [for its invocation) is lacking, that the witness
was peculiarly within the power of the party to produce, and
that his testimony would elucidate the transaction."
States y. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939-940 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit <which earlier had decided the
case relied upon by appellant) held last year that

-26-

a party can properly .ru::.s.u.e. to the jury
the possibility of drawing such an inference
from the absence of a witness,
.llll.l..S..t
establish that the missing witness was
peculiarly within the adversary's power to
produce by showing either that the witness is
physically available only to the opponent or
that the witness has the type of relationship
with the opposing party that pragmatically
renders his testimony unavailable to the
opposing party.
Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co.,
i19 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).

Under this standard, defense counsel was precluded
from arguing the "missing witness" theory to the jury.

The

record does not show that Carrillo and Johnson were peculiarly
within the power of the State to produce as witnesses.

It did

not show that they were involved in any way (e.g., as an

.l.l.D.i.t.e..d

informer) with the development of the State's case.
,lJ;ates v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926-927 (7th Cir.),

•

.iknie..d, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976); Burgess v. United states, 440 F.2d
226, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

Nor does appellant point to any

widence in the record to support a claim that their testimonies
would be noncnmulative or superior to the testimony rendered by
Sanchez and Mitchell.
926 l7th Cir.), cert.

united States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922,
denied, 429 u. s. 1025 (1976); Brown v.

l!Ltite..d States, 414 F.2d 1165, 1166-1167 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Appellant argues, however, that Carrillo and Johnson
were unavailable to the defense in a pragmatic sense, alleging
"lslince the prupose [sic] of having Carrillo and Johnson
'''stify would have been to clear the appellant by incriminating

"mselves, it is not reasonable to believe that either missing
-27-

witness would have testified for the defense."

Even if this

were the case, defense counsel would have been precluded f rorn
alluding to the inf er ence since only one of the two r eq ui remenc,
or conditions of the inference would have been established.
United States v.

463 F.2d 934, 939-940 (D.C. Cir. 1972),

Furthermore, appellant has failed to even establish
this form of unavailability under Utah law, which requires that
appellant first subpoena the missing witnesses to the witness
stand and give them a chance to assert their privileges against
self-incrimination before he may consider them as "unavailable."
In State y. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191 119831, this Court-referring to a missing witness in the case--observed:
There is no merit to the appellant's
contention that defense counsel could not
call Latham to testify because she knew
Latham would invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege. • • Using the exercise of a
privilege as evidence is readily
distinguishable from using it to demonstrate
a declarant's unavailability. The latter,
far from being prohibited, may be required.
Without subpoenaing Latham and interviewing
him • • • • , defense counsel had no means of
establishing whether he would assert his
privilege or not.

*

*

*

[Aln attorney's knowledge that a witness
intends to assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not
bar calling that witness for the purpose of
showing his unavailability.
State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191, 193-194 (19831.
In this case, appellant's counsel asserts that a
decision was made to not use Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses.
Although the above passage may be read as not necessarily
requiring that the witnesses be called by the complaining part1
-28-

'" 5 11 ow

their unavailability, it does make it clear that
ought to have been done to show that unavailability.

record does not show that anything of this nature was done

i'lir

n the present case.

Therefore, appellant has failed to satisfy

first prong of the

test, that the witnesses were

peculiarly within the power of the State to produce.

Judge

Baldwin wisely barred defense counsel from improperly arguing
the "missing witness" inference to the jury.
Appellant claims that the judge's comment did severe
damage to his case at trial.
from

He contends that it prevented him

effectively presenting the theory of his case to the jury,

that it shifted to appellant the burden of producing witnesses,
and that it infringed upon his constitutional right to remain
silent.

These claims are not borne out by the record.
Even if there were some support for these claims,

'ltlhe burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to
upset the judgment."
1267 (1982).

State y. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1266-

The standard which appellant must meet in showing

such error was recently summarized by this court as follows:
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure directs that "!alny error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded." § 77-35-30. We have
interpreted this rule to mean that error is
reversible only if a review of the record
persuades the court that without the error
there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant." ..s..t.a..t..e
v. Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982).
y,

Fontana, Utah, --P.2d--, No. 17796, slip op. at 9

rch 2, 1984).

state y. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329
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(1980); State y. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (1977),

ilh_'_g

.d.eni.e.d, State y. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857, cert denied, 439 u.s.
882 (1978); State y. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1977).
Appellant has not shown that the alleged error in this case was
so substantial or prejudicial that there would have been a
different result in its absence.
Appellant cites a number of cases to support his
position that he had a right to present the theory of his case
to the jury in a clear and understandable way.

He then alleges

that Judge Baldwin erroneously prevented him from exercising
that right during closing argument.
Appellant has misstated these cases, all of which deal
with when and how
court.

instructions are to be presented by the

Moreover, they merely stand for the proposition that,

where there is evidence sufficient to justify a proposed
instruction on a given issue, the trial court has a duty to
adequately instruct the jury on that issue.
Utah, 629 P.2d 442, 446 (1981); State

y.

State y. Stone,

Potter, Utah, 627 P.2d

75, 78 <1981); State y. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (19801:
State y. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 265-266 (1980).
In this case, the defense had not even submitted an
instruction to the court pertaining to the "missing witness"
inference.

Assuming that counsel had even thought of the issue

prior to closing argument, he made a tactical decision to wait
until

.af..t.e...t:

the jury had been instructed and the State had

argued its case to bring up the absence of Carrillo and Johns 00
Appellant now challenges the judge's comment which, he claims,
-30-

"revented him from effectively presenting this theory of his
Certainly, if this had been the theory of his case, he
have at least asked for an instruction in that regard.
It is true that Sanchez was asked on cross-examination
,ihether Carrillo and Johnson were involved in the Winn robbery
!Tl. 68, 80).

But asking those questions and receiving

Sanchez's negative responses were hardly sufficient to make it
appear "obvious from the testimony" that the "missing witness"
issue comprised .the issue (or even

.an

issue) of appellant's

when those questions and responses comprised
a total of less than one page of the 200-plus pages of testimony
rendered at trial (Tl. 68, 80).
In sum, Judge Baldwin prevented appellant from using
the surprise tactic of introducing a new issue at the end of the
trial.

Appellant also argues that the judge's conunent shifted
the burden of production to him, making it appear to the jury
that he had a _du.t,;c to call witnesses.

It is undisputed that the

State bears the burden of proving appellant guilty and that
oopellant has no _du.t,;c to call witnesses that might exculpate
himself.

Utah Code Ann.

§§

76-1-501, 77-1-6(2) (c)

(1978); .s..t.a...t..e.

;, Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92 <1981); State v. Housekeeper,
'-'tah, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (1978).
tl1c

However, it is also clear that

Judge's comment did not depict an affirmative .du.t,;c on
to call Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses.
Judge Baldwin stated, in pertinent part:
I am going to tell the jury you had as much

_r_i_gh.t to bring them in as anybody and they
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were not necessary • • • • [Tlhe State had no
burden as relates to them in this case and
the defendant had all of the ..r;_i_ght_s of the
State to bring them in.
(T3. 36) (emphasis added).
duties.

Judge Baldwin spoke of rights, not

He was merely indicating that the defense could have

called Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses had it believed that
their testimonies were important or essential to a proper
disposition of this case.
Section 77-1-6(2) (cl indicates that a defendant may
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, not that he
has no right to give such evidence.

Here, Judge Baldwin was

merely clarifying the respective rights and duties of the
parties:

the State had no duty to call the two witnesses, and

the defense was not precluded from doing such had it so desired.
Certainly, it was not prejudicial error for the judge to make a
curative or ameliorative statement to the jury in an effort to
neutralize the improper remarks made by defense counsel in his
closing argument.
Finally, appellant claims that as an off shoot of the
defendant's constitutional right to remain silent, a decision
was made not to use particular witnesses; and that the court
erred in commenting on this decision, which comment tended to
impair his right not to produce witnesses.
cases are not on point.

First, appellant's

They address solely the issue of

prosecutorial comment and judicial instruction regarding a
defendant's decision to

.inYQk_e

his constitutional privilege

against self-incrimination and not testify at trial.

They say

nothing of an "offshoot" of that right--a constitutional right
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t,

uQt produce witnesses.

Furthermore, appellant does not show

this comment "clearly tended to impair" that alleged right.
Assuming that the right does follow from the privilege
, pinst self-incrimination,9 appellant is estopped from alleging
error regarding the judge's comment because (1) he waived his
privilege against self-incrimination when he took the stand and
testified; and (2) by his counsel's remarks during closing
arqument about the so-called missing witnesses, he opened
himself up to either judicial comment or prosecutorial rebuttal.
The privilege against self-incrimination is
when a defendant takes the stand and offers his own testimony:
he then is like any other witness at trial.

State v. Green,

Utah, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (1978): State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d
276, 279, 495 P.2d 804,

806 (1972); State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d

377, 380-381, 489 P.2d ll91, 1193 (1971).

Speaking of the

privilege against self-incrimination, this Court observed in
1964:

The defense could either claim the privilege
or waive it, whichever it thought would be to
9 The Fifth Amendment provides that "[nlo person • • • shall be
''ompelled in any criminal case .t..Q
a witness against himself.
" u.s. Const. amend v (emphasis added). The broader language
of the Utah constitutional provision, codified in Utah Code Ann.
5 77-1-6(2) (cl (1978), perhaps more appropriately encompasses the
right argued for by appellant (if it does), where it says that an
"accused shall not be compelled .t..Q _giy_e_ evidence against
himself." Utah Const. art I, § 12 (emphasis added).
Even then,
0 ppellant does not show that the testimony of
the missing
'<itnesses would have been "against himself:" indeed, he indicates
should they have testified, they would have allegedly
<ncrim1nated themselves and exculpated appellant. Appellant has
llloyically tried to convert a personal choice to not call
and Johnson as witnesses (persons who allegedly would
'a•·c
his case J into a constitutionally-protected right.
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its best advantage. But it could not engage
in halfway measures by waiving the privilege
and obtaining the benefit of having [the
defendant] testify and still claim some of
the protection refusal to testify affords . .
• • [Ilf the privilege is claimed it should be
scrupulously protected. But when it is
waived, it is done away with just as though
it did not exist
state y. Brown, 16 Utah 2d 57, 59, 395 P.2d 727, 728-729 <19641.
In this case, appellant took the stand and offered testimony
(T2. 186-218).

Since he had waived his privilege, he had none

upon which the trial judge could comment.

Therefore, no error

was committed.
Furthermore, appellant opened himself up for attack
when

counsel improperly brought up the "missing witness"

issue at trial.

In an analogous situation, this Court has

determined that comment upon issues, which might otherwise be
inappropriate, may be proper when the defendant (or his counsel
opens himself up to attack by his own comments in that regard:
It is of note that the trial court
viewed the prosecution's remarks to be
harmless error, if error at all, as defense
counsel had opened the subject, and the
prosecution was clearly entitled to some
rebuttal • • • • It was unwise and hazardous
for defense counsel to make comments as he
did on defendant's failure to testify, as it
triggered the mechanism or rebuttal by the
prosecution, and hence, may have invited
error • • • • [Tlhe court was wholly within
its discretion in ruling as it did.
State y. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1980).
In this case, it was the judge, and not the
prosecution, which made the comment to correct any "invited
error" made by defense counsel (T3. 36).
reasoning applies.

Nonetheless, the same

Judge Baldwin did not take it upon himselt
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0 mment

on appellant's failure to call Carrillo and Johnson

provocation; the judge was correcting errors made by
.irnse counsel when he improperly commented on the State's

1

a' !eged failure to call them as witnesses.

Having opened up the

discussion on the issue, and having done so in such a way as
might confuse the jury, appellant was not substantially
prejudiced by the judge's curative comment.

Hence, no

constitutional rights were violated.
Even assuming that error was somehow committed by the
Judge's comment, appellant has not properly preserved the issue
for appellate review.
254 (1983),

In State y. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252,

this Court held:

In the absence of exceptional circumstances,
this Court has long refused to review matters
raised for the first time on appeal where no
timely and proper objection was made in the
trial court.
Id. (defendant had failed to make any objection to the court's
comments at the time they were made or during the course of the
trial, and then raised the issue for the first time on appeal).

ill Utah Code Ann.
667 P.2d 32, 33

§

77-35-12(dl

(1982); State v. John, Utah,

(1983); Jaramillo y. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 21,

465 P.2d 343, 344 (1970); State y. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d
174, 406 P.2d 912, 913

(1965).

And in State y. Malmrose, Utah,

G49 P.2d 56, 58 (1982), this Court stated that where no
00 1ection is made at trial,

assignments of error are only to be

to the extent that they bear upon an ineffective
c:isrance of counsel claim.
' ' ·-· 11

Appellant claims no exceptional

o·st ances in his brief to warrant appellate consideration of
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an issue that was waived through the lack of a timely objection
at trial.

Neither does appellant's issue relate to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Appellant should not

now be able to claim prejudice with respect to the court's
comment.
Furthermore, defense counsel never objected to the
judge's comment during the trial.

Appellant did file a motion

for a new trial based upon the comment; however, the motion was
filed five days after appellant had been sentenced, and over a
month after he had been convicted (R. 185-186, 201-202, 205-206,
209-211).
219).

That motion was subsequently argued and denied (R.

Under this Court's ruling in State y. Hales, Utah, 652

P.2d 1290 (1982), this motion came too late to cure appellant's
untimely objection to the judge's comment.

In that case, this

Court observed:
In State y. Zimmerman, 78 Utah at 130, 1 P.2d
at 964, this Court held that a defendant's
objection to a remark made by a judge to the
jury before completion of their deliberation
"must be made before verdict, otherwise it
may not be reviewed on appeal." This
principle applies here • • • • In the
instant case, defendant's failure to lodge a
timely objection that would have allowed the
court to mitigate any damage done by the
prosecutor's comments precludes our review of
the alleged error.
State y. Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1982)
original).

(emphasis in

Likewise, appellant should be precluded from raisi'.

on appeal the trial judge's comment in this case.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, appellant's convictions for
und aggravated robbery should be affirmed, as should the
ower

court's denial of appellant's motion for a new trial.

--r/

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 'j___ day Of October, 1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

--?
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EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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